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On Parasitic Discourse in Till Eulenspiegel: 
Can We Take it Seriously? 
PRISCILLA A. ~ Y D E N - R O Y  
It is the secondary, eccentric, lateral, marginal, parasitic, borderline cases 
which are ~importanta to me and are a source of many things, such as 
pleasure, but also insight into the general functio~ng of a textual system.1 
Thus Jacques Derrida characterizes his approach to language ana- 
lysis in his response to the speech act theorist, John R. Searle.2 Der- 
rida's >>deconcentrating<c stands in contrast to the approach taken in 
speech act theory (SAT), which concentrates on >mrdinary<< lang- 
uage and excludes what J.L. Austin, whose writings are considered 
the foundation of SAT, had called the netiolations<< of language: 
As utterances our performatives are also heir to certain other kinds of ill 
which infect all utterances. And these likewise, though again they might be 
brought into a more general account, we are deliberately at present exclud- 
ing. I mean, for example, the following: a performative utterance will, for 
example, be in a peculiar way hollow and void if said by an actor on the 
stage, or if introduced in a poem, or spoken in a soliloquy. This applies in a 
similar manner to any and every utterance - a sea-change in special cir- 
cumstances. Language in such circumstances is in special ways - intellig- 
ibly - not used seriously, but in ways parasitic upon its normal use - ways 
wich fall under the doctrine of the etiolutions of language. All this we are 
excluding from consideration. Our perfonnative utterances, felicitous or 
not, are to be understood as issued in ordinary circumstances? 
Searle systematized Austin's insights into ordinary speech, 
developing what he called a >>taxonomy of speech acts,<< which 
&fined the conditions that must obtain in order to produce a 
successful speech act. In the first condition for a successful promise 
Searle upholds the Austinian exclusion of >>parasitic forms of 
communication such as telling jokes or acting in a play<<: only then 
do nnormal input and output conditions 0btain.d Demda criticizes 
this exclusion, protesting that parasitism constitutes not an except- 
ion to normal discourse, but the condition for the possibility of 
discourse in general. Parasitism, that is the nnon-serious<< citation 
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of %normal<< discourse, is simply nthe determined modification of a 
general citationality - or rather, a general iterability - without 
which there would not even be a 'successful' performative.<<s 
I have discussed these opposing views of parasitic discourse in 
light of Till Eulenspiegel (TE) elsewherep considering in particular 
a typical nword-play,<< where Till obeys the letter of his master's 
command, while performing something contrary to his will. The 
master's command, be it >>sift in the moonlight,<< >>glue the boards 
together,<< etc., functions as a host for Till, who agrees to obey the 
command, repeating its propositional content in the form of a pro- 
mise. The conventional meaning is unambiguous, but Till construes 
a non-conventional meaning, which is carried by the promise such 
as a host carries a parasite. An analysis using SAT would simply 
disqualify Till's promise, because >>normal input and output condit- 
ions<< do not obtain: Till's promise exhibits precisely that nparasitic 
form() of communication such as telling jokes<< that Searle 
excludes from the successful promise. But Demda argues that to 
ban this sort of parasitism to >>a kind of ditch or external place of 
perdition,<<7 as SAT would do, exposes the ideological foundations 
of this theory. SAT is merely a reproduction of the law it purports 
to be analyzing.8 The conditions for a successful promise as Searle 
defines them reproduce an nethico-politicale set of norms that are 
imbedded in the conventional rules of speech. Demda's notion of 
iterability, on the other hand, views parasitic, non-serious, anti- 
conventional speech not as an exception, but as a fundamental 
possibility of language. Intention and context relatively specify 
meaning, concedes Derrida. >>But this relative purity does not 
emerge in opposition to citationality or iterability, but in opposition 
to other kinds of iteration within a general iterability.<<9 This means 
that m'non-serious' [discourse], the oratio obliqua, [cannot] be 
excluded, as Austin wished, from 'ordinary' language.<<lo Till's 
parasitic use of language is part of ordinary language; it constitutes 
a modification of the general iterability that makes language 
possible in first place. 
The distinction between what we designate as conventional 
language and its parasitic, non-serious usage nevertheless remains 
meaningful. The conventional meaning that solidifies within a soc- 
iety provides a relatively dependable, consistent communicative 
tool which, when reiterated by members of this society, is con- 
sistently understood by all to mean approximately the same thing. 
Parasitic use does constitute an exception to the convention, and 
for this reason Till's parasitic language seems funny. By laughing 
readers indicate they have discovered the joke, the parasitic 
meaning hiding within the host of conventional language. Their 
laughter reinforces the boundaries between conventional and non- 
conventional language; it flags the parasitic usage with a man- 
serious<< marker. Laughter thus is a sort of banishment from serious 
discourse. Till's counterparts within the narrative also eventually 
discover the parasite; they, too, take measures to banish the parasite 
from their home, usually not by laughing at him, but by driving 
him from the premises. Both responses, I would argue, &rive from 
a sense of the normativeness of conventional language. And both 
retrace the same boundaries SAT relies on in defining the condit- 
ions for successful speech acts. Laughter, banishment, the 
exclusion of parasitic language in SAT - all three reflect the 
perspective of an inside group as it defines itself in linguistic, 
social, ethical and political terms over against an outsider. That this 
activity is the prerequisite of language, of communication in 
general, goes without saying. 
The issue we are addressing here, however, concerns how - or 
if - we can take non-serious language seriously, or even legitimate 
it. Derrida wishes to consider marginal, parasitic, borderline cases, 
because they give him >>insight into the general functioning of a 
textual system.<<ll If we simply identify and banish the parasite, we 
will end up retracing the boundaries of convention; if we look at 
the parasite as part of a whole system, then our perspective goes 
beyond that of the insider. This has direct implications for how we 
interpret TE. We can retrace the banishments as they occur repeat- 
edly throughout the chapbook, and conclude that it was the author's 
intention to reinforce given values by warning against behaviors 
that invite infection and destruction of society. TE is a conservative 
admonition to uphold traditional corporative values. An impressive 
case can be made for this interpretation, particularly since with the 
discovery of Herman Bote as TE's author, we have the added 
support of authorial intention.12 But following Derrida we can 
pursue a different interpretive strategy, looking for insights into the 
general functioning of the textual system in TE at the point where 
his parasitism occurs. 
Consider the 69th episode, where Till defecates in the >,House 
of Purity,<< the designation the bathmaster insisted be used for his 
bathhouse. Till appears to be following the bathmaster's convent- 
ion when he says: ~ D a z  di13 ein HauB ist der Reinikeit, daz ist of- 
fenbar, wan wir gon unrein harin und rein wider haruB.<<ls But his 
interpretation of >>purifying<< involves cleaning himself both within 
and without: by defecating in the bathhouse he removes his inner 
impurities, thus indeed becoming pure, as the bathhouse's slogan 
promised. In the eyes of the bathmaster, Till has &filed the bath- 
house. He has brought into the House of Purity what belonged 
outside, in the nouthouse.<< In order to restore the boundaries of 
purity and impurity, he must banish Till and remove his excrement 
from within the bathhouse. But if we as interpreters are not too 
hasty to retrace this banishment; if rather than laughing at Till's 
parasitism we allow it to stand alongside the >mriginal,<< then we 
begin to see the ambiguity of the concept of >>purity.<< The dizzying 
inversions of what constitutes *inside<< and mutsidea in this 
episode begin to expose the conventionality and violability of the 
,>proper<< boundaries, and what we see is the arbitrariness, the 
fragility of one of the most basic designations used to determine 
boundaries, the notion of the ,>pure.<< The episode dramatizes what 
Demda characterizes as parasitism: 
The parasite is by definition never simply external, never simply something 
that can be excluded from or kept outside of the body Bpr0per.u shut out 
from the ~familialu table or house.14 
Seen in this light, the episode does not merely reinforce existing 
boundaries, but rather exposes them as convention, as relative to 
one another, each depending on the other for &finition. This is the 
first step in envisioning a different order. As Demda says: 
Once this parasitism or fictionality can always add another parasitic or fic- 
tional structure to whatever has preceded it ... everything becomes possible 
against the language-police; for example 'literatures' or 'revolutions' that 
as yet have no model.15 
By taking the parasitic discourse nseriously,<< i.e. by setting it 
alongside conventional discourse as part of the entire textual sy- 
stem, rather than banishing it, we are freed from the myth of onto- 
logical necessity that otherwise would anchor the status quo. 
Boundaries defining inside and outside become potentially fiction- 
al, capable of being draped with a new, equally relative, equally 
tropological meaning. 
In the bathhouse episode we see this questioning of the con- 
cept of purity only as a fleeting possibility, which is quickly ban- 
ished in the text through the action of the bathmaster (banishment 
of Till, removal of Till's excrement). Moreover, the reader retraces 
the banishment with hisher laughter. Till's nonconventional read- 
ing of the term >>purity<< is so contrary to the social norm, that the 
reader cannot be confused by the semantic ambiguity Till wishes to 
generate. He or she laughs at what must be read as a joke, as non- 
serious, parasitic discourse. 
In most of the episodes this is the case. However, occasionally 
the potential of relativization is explicitly realized within the text. 
Consider, for example, the 14th episode, where Till, complying 
with the request of the nbest citizens of the city<< of Magdeburg to 
perform a prank, promises to fly from the oriel of the city hall. The 
social convention defining Till as prankster, as outside the nonn, is 
so strong that the crowd willingly suspends its knowledge of reality 
and entertains the fictive notion that a man can fly. Roles are in- 
verted: the social outsider, the parasite of truth, suddenly becomes 
truth's proclaimer, while the crowd, now the fools, are banished to 
the outside. Thus Till proclaims before the gathered throng: 
Ich meinte, es  w k  kein Thor oder Nar mer in der Welt dann ich. So sih ich 
wol, daz hie schier die gantz Stat vol Thoren ist.16 
The inversion is only momentary: the perpetrator of the inversion 
abandons the scene (self-banishment of the outsider), while the 
crowd comes to terms with their shaken identity. Some restore ord- 
er through verbal banishment: they curse the parasite. Others, 
however, laughing at the prank, concede: >>Das ist ein SchalckBnm 
noch, dann so hat er war gesagt.<O The laughter and the designa- 
tion of Till as nSchalckBnm<< restore the conventional relationship 
of inside and outside. But nevertheless, these people also recognize 
that the outsider in this instance assumed the privileged inside pos- 
ition of speaker of the truth. They are willing to relativize the con- 
ventional insiderloutsider relationship, seeing themselves as the 
fools. Their perspective goes beyond that of the insider reinforcing 
conventional boundaries, and for a fleeting instant we see the 
possibility of a different order, a redefinition of boundaries. 
Certainly the people in the narrative do not explore this possib- 
ility, and it would be greatly stretching the possibilities of the text 
to see here a basis for social reform or tolerance. They are willing 
to relativize their own position only after they have twice banished 
the parasite: once with their laughter, and again with the designat- 
ion of nSchalckBnarr.<< Nevertheless, they have, I would argue, 
taken the language of the parasite seriously, they have legitimated 
his words to the extent that they are willing to relativize 
conventional boundaries of truth and fiction, of wisdom and folly. 
Derrida suggests that one gains insight into the total textual 
structure by looking at its borders. Similarly, Till gives us insight 
into the structure of 16th-century society, his wanderings along the 
edge of various social groups tracing the dividing line between in- 
side and outside. But the vast majority of episodes simply rehearse 
banishment again and again, and Till's opponents never consider 
the possibility of relativization. Bote's intention in writing the 
chapbook was admonitory. He wished to warn his society to be on 
their guard, lest their vices open a door to disorder and folly. By 
taking the parasite seriously, by emphasizing the relativizing 
potential in Till's pranks, are we thus led (or misled) to produce a 
historically anachronistic interpretation of the text? If we want to 
interpret the text within its historical context, are we forced to give 
speech act theorists the last word, allowing authorial intention to 
determine the final, nserious<< meaning of the text? 
Derrida has criticized the notion of intentionality in SAT, arg- 
uing that it seals off the unconscious >>by prohibiting that the Un- 
conscious ... be taken seriously; up to and including its capacity for 
making jokes.48 he goes on to discuss Searle's distinction between 
a promise and a threat, which rests on this exclusion of the uncon- 
scious and assumes the speaker of the promiselthreat is aware of 
what the hearer wants, as, of course, is the hearer. But by introduc- 
ing the unconscious, determining intentions becomes highly pro- 
blematic: 
And what if everything that is given to please or in response to a desire, as 
well as everything that one promises to give, were snvcturally ambivalent? 
What if the gift were always poisoned (giftlGgt) in a manner so as to pre- 
vent any simple logic (desirdnon-desire, for example) from being able to 
decide, i.e. to distinguish between the two or to determine their meaning 
univocally?l9 
In the case of TE, perceiving this structural ambivalence brings us 
perhaps as close as possible to its  meaning<< in the 16th century. 
Herman Bote found himself in the midst of social upheavals. The 
structures of society assumed to be stable, ontologically grounded, 
were proving to be violable and precarious. Bote consciously in- 
tended to reintegrate society with his chapbook by strengthening, 
through admonition, the traditional corporate nexus. This conscious 
intention is grounded in a subconscious fear that the nexus was 
merely an artifice lacking necessity, lacking ontological grounding. 
This fear is displaced and indirectly represented through the pro- 
cess of telling jokes about it - the 96 episodes constituting TE. 
Freud has shown the structural parallel between jokes and dreams, 
the common source of both in the subconscious. He writes about 
the production of a joke: 
We have an indefinable feeling ... which I can best compare with an 
'absence', a sudden release of intellectual tension, and then all at once the 
joke is there.20 
Could not Bote's fears have slipped out in this moment of absence, 
of non-consciousness, in the form of the jokes he told? Consciously 
he intended to admonish his society for its weaknesses that invite 
social disintegration. but his pervasive anxiety releases, through the 
Till-jokes, the possibility of disintegration, so that the text begins to 
vacillate between the apparent serious intention of its author and 
the non-serious message his anxiety produces in the form of jokes. 
Social disintegration is portrayed as fiction and is banished repeat- 
edly in the episodes, but fiction comes to assert itself as a fearsome, 
serious possibility. We must recall, too, that Till himself is a figure 
that vacillates between fiction and non-fiction: Bote is careful to 
give biographical data concerning his hero, but as Peter Honeggefll 
has pointed out, the author undermines the reliability of these facts 
with deliberate anachronisms. He does so further with explicit 
inclusion of material from other Schwanke, and with his suggestion 
that readers add their own episodes to the story.22 The work thus 
can never be completely m v i a l i d  as >>mere fiction,<< nor taken 
completely seriously as whistorical fact.<< By its author's own 
definition the work is meant to vacillate between serious and non- 
serious language, between truth and fiction. In his introduction 
Bote, writing anonymously, states that he wrote the book: nallein 
umb ein fr6lich Gemiit zu machen in schweren Zeiten.<<P The 
alleged non-serious, entertaining purpose of the book is inseparably 
linked to the serious reality of its context, the >>bad times<< of social 
upheaval and uncertainty. The jokes were meant to serve as a re- 
lease from the oppression of worry, they had a medicinal purpose. 
H.G. Schrnitz24 has suggested that works such as TE served to drive 
away melancholy; laughter replenished, according to Galenic un- 
derstanding of the bodily humors, the sanguine moisture dried out 
by too much worry. Thus we see that a closer look at the historical 
context of author and text points to a vacillating quality, a 
*structural ambivalenceii: whether it be the psychological ambival- 
ence produced by Bote's anxiety, which expresses itself in the text 
in the vacillation between intentional and non-intentional messag- 
es; or the vacillation between a serious (historical) and a non-ser- 
ious (fictional) narrative; or the structural ambiguity of non-serious 
wentertainment<< whose purpose is to relieve the serious oppression 
of nbad times.<< If we can make a case for this structural 
ambivalence within the work's historical context, then it seems we 
can also justify ntaking seriously<< the jokes, the non-serious lang- 
uage in TE. Within the context of the 16th century we must con- 
cede that these jokes do not signal a revolutionary redefining of 
traditional boundaries. But they are symptomatic of the anxiety 
arising in the face of disintegrating corporative social bonds. 
The question remains, then, why Derridean deconstruction 
seems to provide such a useful heuristic tool for analyzing the 
structural ambivalence of anxiety in TE. A possible explanation is 
that some parallels exist between the collapse of Western 
metaphysics as documented (or even celebrated) in Demda's 
writings and the social disintegration Bote wimessed in 16th- 
century Brunswick. While the one feels pleasure, the other anxiety 
before this collapse, both dramatize it textually with jokes, with 
parasitic discourse. By taking this language seriously, we, too, can 
perhaps gain ninsight into the general functioning of (both) textual 
system(s)<< - each within its historical context. 
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